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CONCEPTUALIZING FORUM SELECTION
AS A "PUBLIC GOOD":
A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR STONE
DENNIS 0. LYNCH*
First, I want to remind everyone about the powerful conceptual imagery
that informs the underlying structure of legal norms governing the unionized
work setting. Scholarly work and case law have glorified the imagery of a
"democratic" work place where unions and employers jointly shape the rules
that determine the rights of labor and management through the administration
of a grievance and arbitration procedure to resolve their disputes.' The collec-
tive agreement or "private law of the workplace" is also enhanced by the con-
sensual "contractarian imagery" that supports the presumption of workers bar-
gaining away their statutory right to strike in exchange for final and binding
arbitration with very limited judicial review.2
In her earlier scholarship, Professor Stone has demonstrated the problem-
atic character of this "imagery" of American labor law.3 In her article in this
Symposium issue,' she extended the logic of her argument to an expanding
preemption doctrine under section 301.' I have made similar arguments in an
* Dean and Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law. B.A., Oregon, 1965;
J.D., Harvard University Law School, 1969; L.L.M., Harvard University Law School 1973; J.S.D.,
Yale Law School, 1979.
1. Archibald Cox, Reflections upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARv. L. REV. 1482 (1959);
Archibald Cox, The Right to Engage in Concerted Activities, 26 IND. LJ. 319 (1951); see also
Note, Arbitration After Communications Workers: A Diminished Role?, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1307,
1309 (1987).
The Court placed arbitration at the heart of collective agreements in the Steelworkers Trilo-
gy of 1960. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960) (holding
that an arbitration award should be enforced when it draws its essence from the collective bargain-
ing agreement); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960)
("[T]he grievance machinery under a collective bargaining agreement is at the very heart of a
system of industrial self-government."); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564
(1960) (holding that when a dispute falls within an arbitration clause, its merits are irrelevant to
enforcement).
2. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 582-83 (when the scope of an agreement to
arbitrate is ambiguous, courts should resolve doubts in favor of coverage and order the parties to
arbitrate); see Dennis 0. Lynch, Defense, Waiver, and Arbitration Under the NRLA: From Status
to Contract and Back Again, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 237, 241 & n.18 (1989).
3. See, e.g., Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Legacy of Industrial Pluralism: The Tension
Between Individual Employment Rights and the New Deal Collective Bargaining System, 59 U.
CHI. L. REV. 575 (1992); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Postwar Paradigm in American Labor
Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509 (1981).
4. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment
Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENY. U. L. REV. 1017, 1049-50 (1996).
5. Id.
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earlier article regarding the deferral to arbitration of the resolution of
employees' statutory rights under the National Labor Relations Act.6
I will devote my brief comments to a distinct set of questions as a way of
forcing us to think about our assumptions regarding the differences between
public and private ordering. Are there characteristics that are necessarily inher-
ent in the differences between public and private fora that cause us to oppose
trends toward increased reliance on the New Private Law in the labor field or
are we primarily reacting to our empirical observations of labor arbitration as
a forum for resolving statutory rights? Would we be as concerned if employ-
ees had the option of taking their statutory claims to a public or private fo-
rum?
Focusing on these questions forces us to consider the importance of the
process for resolving claims and the doctrine governing that process as a "pub-
lic good." The legal doctrine governing a statutory right benefits all parties
similarly situated by making the resolution of their respective rights more
predictable and easier to resolve without litigation. The value of legal doctrine
as a "public good" may, in some circumstances, be in tension with an
employee's access to a cost effective and fair procedure for resolving a statu-
tory claim. What we may regard as an appropriate balance between these two
interests may turn on how we think about the following: (1) the methods
available for the selection of arbitrators and their knowledge of legal doctrines
governing statutory rights; (2) the procedures available through arbitration for
obtaining information prior to a hearing; (3) employees' perceptions of the
opportunities to have a voice and to be heard in a non-intimidating setting; (4)
the effectiveness of the remedies available to the parties in arbitration; (5)
arbitrators' views of the relative importance in resolving conflicts of the cul-
ture and specific context of a particular work setting as balanced against the
public policies underlying the statutory right at issue; and (6) the potential to
realize a "public good" from the private forum of arbitration. I will touch
briefly on each of these considerations and then end with the question of what
really bothers us about the New Private Law of statutory rights in the
workplace.
The process for selecting arbitrators has a major impact on the perceived
legitimacy of the arbitration forum.7 One can argue that the type of "industry
panel" that would hear Gilmer's age discrimination claim would be more
sensitive to the culture and needs of stock brokerage firms than to the public
policy underlying the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.8 In addition
Gilmer would not be a "repeat player" in arbitration with a long run interest in
6. Lynch, supra note 2.
7. See G. Richard Shell, ERISA and Other Federal Employment Statutes: When Is Commer-
cial Arbitration an "Adequate Substitute" for the Courts? 69 TEX. L. REV. 509, 534-40 (1990);
Jean R. Stemlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for
Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637 ("[A]rbitration clauses are crucial in that they not
only bar judicial review but also may allow companies to select the arbitrators .... ").
8. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30-31 (1991) (finding that
plaintiffs had failed to show that existing protections against bias in NYSE arbitration panel se-
lection were insufficient).
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making sure there was no inherent bias in the selection of industrial panels to
hear disputes arising through a brokers' work and governed by the arbitration
clause in the standard stock exchange registration form.9 In the case of arbi-
tration under collective agreements, the union is a "repeat player" just as is the
employer. Both parties to the arbitration agreement are in a position to main-
tain information on the backgrounds, opinions, open-mindedness, and basic
fairness of the arbitrators they jointly select. The union and the employer will
have information on the way the arbitrators they select handle discovery re-
quests, conduct hearings, and reason to a final decision. They can also re-
search the way the arbitrator deals with statutory issues when they come up in
the context of resolving the rights of parties under the collective agreement.
The real problem with the arbitration of a statutory right under the arbitration
clause of a collective agreement may be whether the union and the individual
employee actually have a shared interest in the way the arbitrator resolves the
statutory claim. As has been clear in some Title VII disputes in unionized
work settings, the union may have a stronger interest in maintaining a good
working relationship in the workplace than protecting individual statutory
rights.' °
In the non-union setting, the individual employee will not have to worry
about a partial conflict of interest with the union over the precedent an arbitra-
tor may establish under a collective agreement, but the employee will not be
in as strong a position to invest in maintaining information on the biases and
approaches of different arbitrators. As a "one-time player" in arbitration, the
employee will not have access to the same quality of information. The
employee will be forced to rely on the incentives for a specialized bar han-
dling individual employee claims in arbitration to maintain the information
they need to protect the interests of their clients in the selection of arbitrators.
In addition, the arbitrator will know the individual employee is not likely to be
involved in the selection of an arbitrator in the future so there is less incentive
for the arbitrator to worry about the employee's reaction to the arbitrator's
opinion. Again the employee must rely on the arbitrator's concern over the
reaction of the employee's attorney to the arbitrator's opinion. It is clear that a
specialized bar that regularly represents employees in the protection of
statutory rights is critical to the fairness of a New Private Law in the labor
field.
The second major criticism of arbitration involves its procedural charac-
teristics in terms of the lack of discovery, less formal rules of evidence, and
no judicial review of the arbitrator's interpretation and application of legal
9. Id. at 23 (noting that Gilmer was a 62-year-old individual ADEA plaintiff).
10. See, e.g., Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 62
(1974) ("Congress sought to secure to all members of the unit the benefits of their collective
strength and bargaining power, in full awareness that the superior strength of some individuals or
groups might be subordinated to the interest of the majority."); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,
415 U.S. 36, 58 n.19 (1974) (noting that "a further concern is the union's exclusive control over
the manner and extent to which an individual grievance is presented"); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S.
171, 182 (1966) (characterizing subordination of individual interests under collective bargaining
system as a necessity); Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 653 (1965) ("If a griev-
ance procedure cannot be made exclusive, it loses much of its desirability as a settlement.").
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doctrine." At the same time arbitration is what we could call a very "plastic"
forum. It can become what the parties want it to be. They can shape its char-
acteristics by contract and by mutual instructions to the arbitrator they select.
The range can be anywhere from replicating the characteristics of a public
court to a very relaxed and informal process. A union and employer can bar-
gain over the procedural characteristics they prefer in arbitration with the pos-
sible exception of the degree of judicial review they prefer.'2 The individual
employee signing an arbitration clause with an employer is not in the same
position to bargain over the procedural issues. Once a dispute arises, the
employee's attorney may not be able to negotiate over the characteristics of
the arbitration forum unless the law gives the employee an election of forum
option that the attorney can use as leverage in negotiation with the employer.
The election of forum would give the employer an incentive to craft a cost
effective and fair forum that would be attractive to the specialized plaintiff's
bar as an alternative to adjudication.
An additional procedural concern is the lack of discovery in arbitration. 3
We all know that the burdens and costs of discovery can make it a negative as
well as positive procedural device. A threat to drive up the costs of litigation
by excessive discovery can make it impractical to litigate many employee
claims for lesser amounts. We can not provide a definite answer as to whether
a public or private forum will offer an employee better access to a fair disput-
ing process at reasonable cost without knowing a good deal more about the
specifics of the employee's statutory claim.
There is also the question of how the employee will relate to the structural
characteristics of a court as compared to arbitration. Employees want a legiti-
mate opportunity to tell their story, to voice the problems they have encoun-
tered as well as obtain a remedy. From an anthropological perspective, courts
are a very formal and intimidating atmosphere with the judge in a robe, the
raised dais, jury venire, and evidentiary constraints on the presentation of
evidence. A skilled arbitrator can make the setting for the employee's testimo-
ny more relaxed and less formal with everyone at a table together and fewer
objections interrupting the presentation of testimony. An arbitrator's skill and
knowledge of the law will depend on training and experience, but the point is
we can not assume an arbitrator selected by the parties after a review of the
arbitrator's background will be less skilled and knowledgeable than a judge.
As university professors, we may be more effective by focusing on how to
11. See, e.g., Richard A. Bales, Compulsory Arbitration of Employment Claims: A Practical
Guide to Designing and Implementing Enforceable Agreements, 47 BAYLOR L. REv. 591 (1995).
12. 1 have never seen a collective bargaining agreement that defines the scope of judicial
review more broadly than the Steelworkers Trilogy. Federal courts, however, have developed a
limited public policy exception to judicial deference to arbitration. See United Paperworkers Int'l
Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 42 (1987) (limiting a court's ability to refuse to enforce an
arbitrator's interpretation of a collective agreement "to situations where the contract as interpreted
would violate 'some explicit public policy' that is 'well-defined and dominant, and is to be ascer-
tained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of sup-
posed public interests"') (quoting W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766
(1983)).
13. See Bales, supra note 11.
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educate better arbitrators regarding the issues surrounding employees' statutory
rights than to assume that judges selected through a political process are pref-
erable.
The remedies available in arbitration are an enormous problem. 4 As Pro-
fessor Stone noted, arbitrators feel very constrained regarding remedies.
They lack the contempt power of the courts making provisional remedies and
certain other forms of equitable relief difficult to administer. Indeed the con-
fused body of law surrounding the jurisdiction of federal courts to issue an
order to maintain the status quo pending arbitration of a dispute aptly illus-
trates this problem. 6 The real question is whether there is a creative way to
address the problem of remedies while maintaining the integrity of arbitration.
For example, expedited arbitration with court enforcement of the arbitrator's
award if needed could be used in some circumstances.
The mindset of arbitrators can also present an issue. An arbitrator who
works regularly in a specific type of industry will become schooled in the cul-
ture of the workplace in that industry. That can be a plus or a minus depend-
ing on the nature of the dispute. Of course, the alternative may be the adjudi-
cation of an employee's rights before a judge who has no knowledge of the
workplace in question. I mentioned earlier, the possible negative aspects of the
mindset of an arbitrator who was selected by the parties and who knows that
the parties may not select her again if they are not satisfied with the handling
of the case and the arbitrator's opinion. An arbitrator does look at a case
through different lenses than a judge who is selected through a process totally
independent of the case in question and who may or may not stand for reten-
tion through a political process. My point is that the judicial mindset may not
always be the preferred one. We ought to at least ask questions about differ-
ences in the mindset of the adjudicators in the two fora in a thoughtful man-
ner, informed by more empirical observation.
I started with the value of judicial opinions as a "public good." The visi-
bility of judicial opinions and the public debate surrounding legislative correc-
14. See id.; see also Stone, supra note 4, at 1039-41.
15. Stone, supra note 4, at 1047 n.197.
16. See, e.g., Niagra Hooker Employees Union v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 935 F.2d 1370
(2d Cir. 1991); IBEW Local 733 v. Ingalls Shipbuilding Div., 906 F.2d 149 (5th Cit. 1990) (both
holding that an employer's prior agreement to maintain status quo pending arbitration as sufficient
but not necessary for a grant of injunctive relief); United Steelworkers v. Fort Pitt Steel Mfg., 598
F.2d 1273, 1278-79 (3d Cir. 1979) (endorsing three elements to consider in determining NLA
preclusion of injunction: (1) whether the dispute is subject to arbitration, (2) whether the party is
interfering or frustrating arbitral process, and (3) the propriety of an injunction over "ordinary
principles of equity"); Lever Bros. Co. v. Chemical Wkrs. Local 217, 554 F.2d 115 (4th Cit.
1976) (stating that the purpose of the anti-injunction exception was to ensure that arbitration
would not be merely a "hollow formality"); see also International Union, United Automobile,
Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of American, UAW v. Textron Lycoming Recip-
rocating Engine Div., 919 F. Supp. 783 (D. Pa. 1996) (applying "irreparable harm" test). But cf
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, 847 F. Supp. 1294
(E.D. Pa. 1994); Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters, and Helpers Local Union
No. 414, 839 F. Supp 1339 (N.D. Ind. 1993); Teamsters Assoc. v. Japanese Edu. Inst., 724 F.
Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); see also Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chicago Newspaper
Publishers Ass'n, 620 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1980) (defining Seventh Circuit test as whether arbitral
remedies would be "wholly inadequate" to redress a contractual violation).
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tions to unpopular judicial opinions is an important element of our democratic
process. Whether similar debate can be generated by the repetitive arbitration
of similar disputes is an open issue. Since the concept of precedent is deeply
embedded in our jurisprudence, we can expect private services to develop and
to reduce the cost of obtaining arbitrators' opinions. New technologies should
make this even easier. Parties specializing in employment law will read and
evaluate the opinions and will pursue ways to change an evolving doctrine in
arbitration that they do not like. In collective bargaining, unions and employers
regularly bargain around the opinions of arbitrators. They also use public
policy arguments to increase the scope of judicial review of arbitrators'
opinions." The relationship between arbitrators and courts need not be
viewed as fixed in stone. It can be adjusted to make both work together to
better serve the ends of justice.
In reality I am much more skeptical of the use of arbitration to resolve
statutory claims than these comments suggest. I do believe, however, that we
would benefit from a much more serious comparative examination of institu-
tional fora for settling disputes. Each will have their own particular character-
istics that yield benefits and detriments. Their positive and negative qualities
may vary depending on the nature of the claim underlying the dispute. One
way to learn more is to encourage doctrines that leave parties with a choice of
fora and to study the conflicts they encounter over the choice of forum.
We are worried because we see employers beginning to force a choice on
employees through mandatory arbitration clauses. Before these mandatory
clauses, employees could have voluntarily agreed to arbitrate in lieu of going
to court, but there was not much incentive for the parties to invest in the de-
velopment of specialized arbitration panels for statutory disputes. Can we
develop an improved arbitration option while maintaining the right of
employees to elect their preferred forum? We would certainly learn more
about the comparative qualities of different fora for resolving similar conflicts.
17. Misco, 484 U.S. at 43.
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